Research Paper on The Deterrence Strategy for Nuclear Weapons
Deterrence Strategy for Nuclear Weapons
Deterrence Strategy for Nuclear Weapons Essay – It is considered that countries that are nuclear states possess greater power. However, the argument has been presented that the strengthening of the economy does not merely depend on the nuclear weapons they have or cannot be measured by how much armament the nation has, moreover it is gage by the military, economic, and political strength.
For instance, nations such as Germany and Japan are not nuclear states but are still considered to be as powerful nations the reason being their military and political strength.
On the other hand, countries that are counted in the list of nuclear states such as North Korea, Pakistan, and Israel are still not considered to be as powerful nations.
Although nuclear weapons enforce a threat to certain nations and in maintaining worldwide peace, still arguments are presented for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Terrorists do not fear the threat of deterring nuclear weapons they would continue to kill themselves frequently and nothing could impose a threat or fear on them that would dissuade them from committing terrorist activities.
However, the deterrence strategy would still cause some positive effects and will prove to be helpful in maintaining peace.
What is Deterrence?
Nuclear deterrence is currently being questioned, but this does not imply that it is dying out. Perhaps only a French expert would have the courage to make this point in public in the current climate.
In the United States, there is a notion that nuclear weapons are a cumbersome relic of the Cold War that has become irrelevant and may be detrimental to national and international security.
It is suggested that deterrence is still essential to the United States’ national security policy, but that it would be possible to accomplish it using a variety of strategies, from preventative diplomacy to military deterrents with contemporary conventional weapons.
Most people feel that conventional forces will continue to play a bigger role in deterrence going forward. However, as a number of intelligent academics have noted, it is still unclear if nuclear weapons can be eliminated in the post-Cold War world.
Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the choice of whether to keep or get rid of nuclear weapons has undoubtedly gotten more complicated, and both pro and con reasons must be considered.
The current state of geopolitical instability in the world is one thing that is undeniable. Much has to be determined, both in terms of how state relations are changing.
Deterrence Strategy for Nuclear Weapons
In the 1930s, deterrence took on its modern shape as a result of the capacity to target an enemy’s whole civilian population and civil infrastructure without first subduing its ground and naval forces.
The first time airplanes and dirigibles were utilized militarily was during World War I, and relatively immediately after that, they were used to assault cities.
The rise of air power in the 1920s and 1930s allowed for the theories of Douhet and other military strategists, notwithstanding the minimal impact of these terrorist strikes.
According to their theory of strategic air warfare, air forces might launch a campaign against the key components of state power necessary to win a war on their own with little to no assistance from the ground and naval forces.
In the end, both sides of World War II turned to urban bombing quite early. 7 Conventional bombing might be mitigated to some extent, but neither the threat of strategic conventional bombing nor strategic bombing on its own could prevent conflict from breaking out. With the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the lessons of World War II dramatically shifted.
It was obvious that nuclear weapons posed a threat of harm that was intolerable by any standard and would be nearly difficult to fend against. In 1946, Bernard Brodie published The Absolute Weapon, which quickly advanced the nuclear deterrence hypothesis.
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962
The world barely avoided what could have been a nuclear conflict between the United States and the former Soviet Union (USSR) during the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. (US).
Since then, numerous nations—most notably those at odds with one another, Pakistan and India being the most prominent examples—have increased the size of their nuclear arsenals.
However, the essential query is: Why has the world been able to prevent a nuclear war despite officially nine countries possessing nuclear weapons?
International Relations theorists provide the “logic of nuclear deterrence,” which was popularized during the Cold War by scholars like Thomas Schelling and BD Berkowitz, as their response to this query.
There is no denying that with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity, the global landscape has changed. Concern over China’s nuclear arsenal and its ability to use them against the US and its regional competitor India is rising as the power struggle between China and the US heats up.
Then there is North Korea, which continues to produce nuclear weapons while rejecting Washington DC’s offer for denuclearization. This article contends that nuclear deterrence should receive some credit for the fact that, despite these conflicts, the world has managed to avoid a nuclear conflict.
This logic’s fundamental tenet is that one actor may prohibit another from acting by making them fearful of the results of their actions.
Theoretically, if Country A starts a nuclear war with Country B, Country B will be able to harm Country A enough to cause what experts refer to as “mutually assured destruction.” In a nuclear conflict, both sides would suffer such great losses that it would be difficult to determine which side had prevailed.
Even if one of them makes an effort to strike and neutralize its rival’s nuclear arsenal, the other would still have access to enough of them to cause intolerable harm.
The existence of nuclear proliferation is considered important in today’s world as it is believed that it is important to have nuclear weapons for security purposes, and nations acquire weapons as a symbol of prestige.
The view is also that with the passage of time and advancement in technology, there has been a rise in the development of nuclear weapon research and development has led states to develop their armaments.
The subject of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation is worthy of debate. It has been argued over the issue that the effects of WMD proliferation depend on the pace at which it is spread, a slow proliferation does not have an adverse effect.
It should be considered preferable in context to maintaining security as compared to no proliferation or a quick one, as nuclear states have less threat from being attacked by the other states.
Despite having 40,000 nuclear bombs each in their arsenals—the US had 30,000 and the USSR had 40,000—the two countries avoided a nuclear conflict. An examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis reveals that, at its height, a nuclear conflict between the superpowers appeared all but certain.
The leaders were adamant about avoiding nuclear conflict since it would destroy both nations. Because of this, the US chose to intercept Soviet warships rather than confront them immediately, and Moscow withdrew meekly.
As a result of deterrence, the superpowers entered into negotiations, with the Soviet Union agreeing to remove its missiles from Cuba in exchange for a US guarantee not to invade Cuba and President Kennedy even agreeing to remove American missiles from Turkey.
Issues of Deterrence Strategy for Nuclear Weapons
One of the major problems faced by humanity today is the proliferation of nuclear weapons; therefore, it is significant to understand the need to prevent it.
The argument over the effects of nuclear weapon proliferation continues with the belief that smaller armaments are much easier to sell and therefore, cause a greater threat to the economies to maintain peace, on the contrary.
The view is presented that the availability of nuclear weapons would result in mass destruction in one blow, and a decision made by an individual tends, to destroy a greater number of people as compared to that of conventional weapons as discussed above.
However, several academics have expressed skepticism against the logic of deterrence, claiming that simply because it prevented a nuclear conflict between the US and the Soviet Union does not imply that it is a “proved reality.”
Leaders have been admonished by nuclear strategists to take caution when basing their security policies on this reasoning. For instance, the threat by North Korea to start a nuclear war with the US has caused many scholars and advisors to have second thoughts.
A nation’s security policy shouldn’t be based on the logic of nuclear deterrence, according to some, because it is only a “hypothesis” and not an accepted norm.
Nuclear deterrence is predicated on the idea that a nation will refrain from beginning a nuclear war in order to safeguard its own security.
This argument has several unpredictable factors, such as the possibility of nuclear weapons being misused if control were to fall into the wrong hands, or a soldier purposefully launching a nuclear conflict to cause trouble.
Nations have recognized the value of nuclear deterrence, and it is a key component of their security plans. Even in a post-Cold War world, the concept of nuclear deterrence is quite relevant.
Nations have recognized the value of nuclear deterrence, and it is a key component of their security plans. Countries use it as a negotiating chip to prevent nuclear retaliation from other nations.
The use of alternative tactics, such as peace negotiations and confidence-boosting measures, can help nuclear deterrents work better since it is not the only solution to security issues.
Although it is obvious that nations recognize the value of nuclear deterrents, the possibility of a nuclear strike by non-state actors still exists since deterrence as a tactic is likely to fall short in such circumstances.